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Legislative Strengthening meets Party Support in International Assistance: a 
Closer Relationship? 
 
PETER BURNELL∗
 
 
Recent reports recommend that international efforts to help strengthen legislatures in 
emerging democracies should work more closely with support for building stronger 
political parties and competitive party systems. The article locates the 
recommendations within international assistance more generally and reviews the 
arguments. It explores problems that must be addressed if the recommendations are 
to be implemented effectively. The article argues that an alternative, issue-based 
approach to strengthening legislatures and closer links with civil society could gain 
more traction. However that is directed more centrally at promoting good governance 
for the purpose of furthering development than at democratisation goals sought by 
party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry.  
 
International democracy assistance to emerging democracies has grown steadily from 
the late 1980s to over US$5 billion annually. Electoral assistance and support for civil 
society are well-documented features. Help with legislative strengthening and 
building stronger political parties and competitive party systems is more modest and 
has received less attention. However many countries have been the object of one or 
both types of support.1
                                                 
∗ Peter Burnell is Professor in the Department of Politics, University of Warwick, England. He would 
like to thank the journal’s referees for very helpful comments of an earlier version of this article.  
And recent years have seen growing interest among 
international actors interested in strengthening legislatures in pioneering new 
 2 
approaches, 2
 
 one of which recommends closer involvement with efforts to strengthen 
political parties and party systems.  
This article does not offer a comprehensive survey of legislative strengthening: timely 
reviews of varying scope are readily accessible elsewhere (for example Hudson and 
Wren 2007; Wehner et al. 2009). Rather it focuses more particularly on the 
recommendation in reports and inquiries into support for legislative strengthening for 
closer cooperation with assistance to party strengthening. The case for investigating 
this recommendation is underlined by Power’s (2008: 23) observation that 
parliamentary and party support have in fact been ‘entirely separate disciplines in 
terms of analysis, evaluation, and practice’.  If the reasons for this state of affairs can 
be identified then the chances that the recommendations will be implemented 
successfully can be assessed more accurately. To do this, however, the issue must be 
introduced, first, within a broader account of organisations involved in international 
democracy support and the sort of activities that legislative and party strengthening 
involve. A second section sets out arguments in favour of the recommendation; the 
third section raises counter-arguments. These suggest that expectations should be 
moderate. The fourth section argues that different ways of approaching legislative 
strengthening may gain more traction. But these are geared more to promoting good 
governance for the purpose of promoting development than democratisation goals 
sought by party aid and legislative strengtheners in the democracy assistance industry. 
A conclusion summarises the main points. 
 
INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE, LEGISLATIVE 
STRENGTHENING AND PARTY SUPPORT 
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International democracy assistance conventionally refers to consensual and grant 
aided support for activities designed to help countries move in the direction of 
establishing and consolidating western style liberal democracy. The borderline 
between this and support for improving governance is blurry; good governance and 
democratisation are two policy agendas that often seem inextricably linked, as in the 
term democratic governance. But while not mutually exclusive their respective 
emphases are different. For instance tackling corruption (the use of public office for 
private gain) and its roots feature prominently in efforts to improve accountable 
governance, but while relevant to judging democratic performance it is less central in 
theories of democracy and democratisation, where ideas of participation, contestation 
and opportunities for the people to make political choices are fundamental.3
 
 
The many international organisations now involved in support for democratisation can 
be classified in several ways, even after differentiating all of them from those 
organisations whose main reason for supporting stronger legislatures is to ensure 
better governance for the end of advancing development. A leading of example of this 
second group is the World Bank Institute, the capacity development arm of the World 
Bank, whose extensive knowledge-sharing activities include producing an Orientation 
Handbook for Members of Parliament (2006), as well as detailed reports on 
parliamentary oversight for government accountability generally and budgetary 
matters particularly.4
 
 
A patchwork quilt of democracy assistance organisations 
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Some organisations assisting democratisation are multilateral, for example the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) with an annual budget for this purpose of 
around $1.5 billion; others are bilateral or nationally based, for instance Britain’s 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), an independent public body with 
annual funding around £4.1 million from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.5 
Some are governmental, notable examples being the United States Agency for 
Development (USAID), whose 2009 funding bid for ‘governing justly and 
democratically’ exceeds US$1.7 billion, and the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA).6
 
 Others have autonomous status even when funded 
from official sources, like the Netherland Institute for Multiparty Development 
(NIMD), funded by Dutch taxpayers in excess of 10 million Euros annually. Some are 
aid donors but like USAID and Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DFID) employ many others to execute projects and programmes; others are primarily 
operational and rely on receiving grants or contracts. These include autonomous not-
for-profit entities, private consultants, commercial actors and some regional 
parliamentary networks. 
The largest organisations like USAID are involved in a wide range of activities 
associated with all main sectors and sub-sectors of what Carothers (1999: 88) calls the 
‘democracy template’ - support for the electoral process, state institutions, and civil 
society; others are more highly specialised: the very titles of the NIMD and the 
Parliamentary Centre of Canada (PCC), both of which are non-profit organisations, 
indicate their respective specialisms.7 The United Nations’ broader commitment to 
nation-building and conflict resolution gives the UNDP a distinctive interest in 
advancing the contribution that both parliaments and parties can make to securing 
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domestic peace. Whereas the main intergovernmental and some of the larger national 
organisations support or execute democracy support programmes and projects widely 
in many countries others concentrate more narrowly. An example is Australia’s 
Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI), whose mandate concentrates on just 
parliamentary and party work, focusing on Indonesia and Pacific island states. 8
 
 All 
the organisations have web-sites where mission statements and descriptions can be 
found. 
Organisations and their legislative and party support activities 
Generally speaking development organisations feature much more strongly in 
legislative support than in political party support, but legislative strengthening is 
certainly not exclusive to development agencies; however, some of the organisations 
most committed to party support do not regard legislative strengthening as a major 
objective.  
 
In regard to legislative strengthening, an initial canvas for the report Benchmarks for 
Democratic Legislatures (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 2006: Foreword 
4) identified approximately 19 parliamentary associations and development agencies 
working in the field of parliamentary democracy, as sponsor, implementer or adviser 
on programmes. Notable examples are the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), active 
since the 1970s9 and the CPA itself. The World Bank Institute (WBI) too has a strong 
interest, as do the NDI, a non-profit grantee of the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) funded by the US Congress, and SIDA, as well as UNDP, USAID, 
PCC and CDI. Britain’s DFID is currently showing considerable interest too: a recent 
report from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) encourages it to do so.10 
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In regard to strengthening political parties in new or emerging democracies the 
international organisations include some (but not all) of the organisations already 
mentioned, such as UNDP, USAID, NDI (and its counterpart the International 
Republican Institute) and CDI but not the WBI. Others who are prominent in the 
world of party support but have no comparable commitment to legislative 
strengthening include Germany’s political foundations (Stiftungen, affiliated to 
Germany’s political parties), political parties in several long-established democracies 
like Britain who befriend new parties in emerging democracies often on a partisan 
basis, the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support, and NIMD which is currently 
involved with over 150 parties in 17 countries chiefly in Africa and Latin America.11
 
 
Just as legislatures and political parties both in theory perform several distinct 
functions for democracy, so legislative strengthening and party support are not single 
monolithic or, even, static activities. Manuals and the like have proliferated: examples 
are USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening (2000) and UNDP’s A Handbook 
on Working with Political Parties (2006). The main activities are described 
elsewhere.12 In essence, party support has traditionally concentrated on direct 
assistance to parties, even where one of the goals (now becoming more prominent) is 
to encourage the development of properties at the level of the overall party system, 
such as competitiveness, stability and preventing excessive fragmentation. Depending 
on the actor, assistance is extended on partisan (now becoming less dominant), 
multiparty and cross-partisan bases. USAID for example is not supposed to 
discriminate between democratic parties, whereas Germany’s Stiftungen have a 
history of partisan support.  In contrast to the 1990s when much assistance focussed 
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on helping new parties with election strategies and campaigning skills, party 
institutionalisation in the longer-term is now a major object. This includes party 
organisation, fund-raising, message development and policy research skills. What 
Carothers (2006: 114-5) calls the ‘standard method’ comprises advice, training, some 
material aid, workshops and seminars, and exchange visits. More prosaic, CDI says its 
annual political party development course ‘covers the nuts and bolts of party politics 
from the inside’13
 
 NIMD’s interest in post-conflict societies gives it a special interest 
in brokering cross-party consensus on rules of competitive behaviour.   
Legislative strengthening similarly comprises an assortment of activities, with 
different organisations having different emphases; the overall balance too has tended 
to evolve over time.14 For USAID a Legislative Strengthening Advisor has listed the 
goals or objectives as more effective, independent, and representative legislatures; 
more effective and democratic internal management systems; increased capacity to 
influence national policy and budget priorities; and increased citizen access. 
Improving legislative standards, advancing legislative development, and refining the 
administration and financing of parliaments are typical remits (Schultz 2007). More 
simply Power distinguishes structural support, which includes help with building the 
institutional and technical capacity of parliament (stocking libraries for instance), 
procedural support especially in relation to the role of parliamentary committees, and 
functional support for improving MPs’ ability to understand and perform their 
representative, legislative and oversight functions. He notes that the concentration on 
structural support which characterised earlier decades has since broadened out to the 
other forms (Power 2008: 4-5).15 UNDP specifically has diversified away from 
support to parliaments’ law-making and representation functions towards 
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parliamentary oversight (especially in Africa), an aspect where development aid 
donors exhibit a strong interest in regard to financial oversight especially. Training 
sessions, workshops and study visits still provide popular mediums.  
 
There is increasing discussion in some of the recent reports on legislative 
strengthening about the need to move further in the direction of grappling with the 
parliaments’ political environment, meaning the political incentive structure that faces 
MPs.16 This can be understood as a reference to the compelling demand - framed by 
the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic political cultures typical of many developing 
countries - on MPs to deliver government spending on essential public goods and 
services to their constituents. This emphasis is often thought to deflect 
parliamentarians from spending time and energy on other essential parliamentary 
functions.17
 
 Political parties are also important in shaping the incentive structure.  
Closing the gap 
As shown, although the organisations involved in legislative strengthening and in 
party support are not identical the clusters do overlap. And yet the two areas of 
activity have tended to proceed in parallel and along separate lines, even when funded 
or, even, carried out by the same organisation.18 Recommendations in a number of 
reports on legislative strengthening are that the gap should be closed in the interests of 
improving the performance of legislative strengthening, where the evidence from 
evaluations indicates much scope exists for raising effectiveness. The 
recommendations are not echoed to anything like the same degree by supporters of 
party assistance,19 and nor do they claim to have the solution for more effective 
legislative support. Furthermore not every organisation now showing a strong interest 
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in legislatures is keen to engage with parties. The WBI is a case in point. This is in 
keeping with the constraints on political involvement that are placed on the World 
Bank by its mandate as a development bank which at all times must value good 
working relations with governments.  Indeed Hubli and Schmidt (2007: 23) even 
claimed that ‘many Bank officials still equate active support for parliamentary 
involvement with political interference’, although even if once true their claim has 
been overtaken by evolution in the Bank’s governance and anti-corruption strategy, 
which now calls for the Bank to support parliaments. 
 
Nevertheless, an accumulating body of opinion does appear to consider the idea of 
some form of coming together of legislative and party work attractive. Almost a 
decade ago USAID’s Handbook on Legislative Strengthening (2000: 23) mentioned 
the desirability of taking more account of party structures and dealing with party 
system fragmentation; then UNDP (2003: 13) signalled renewing its attention to 
parties as ‘critical actors’, because ‘building more democratic and functional parties is 
an important aspect of parliamentary development’.20 Recently the chorus has 
swelled: in 2007 an evaluation of SIDA’s legislative support recommended improved 
‘coordination and integration’ of parliamentary and political party programming 
(Hubli and Schmidt 2007: 7). And in Britain in 2008 first an ODI report to DFID 
(Hudson and Wren 2007: 48) and then a report by AAPPG observed that 
parliamentary development is linked to the state of the parties. Hudson and Tsekpo 
(2009: 5), from ODI and PCC respectively, elaborate that in order to support the 
emergence of parliamentary democracy as competition between ideas and agendas, 
international partners ‘urgently need to engage more effectively’ with parties. The 
AAPPG invites DFID to consider working with leading political party institutes, to 
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support the development of parties: ‘There is insufficient coordination between the 
work of organisations providing support to political parties and the work of 
development partners providing support to parliament. This must change’ (AAPPG 
2008: 11). Of the organisations for whom party building has been their main 
commitment, one that stands out here is the Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
(WFD), whose Chief Executive, David French (2008), wants WFD to become more 
involved in parliamentary strengthening.21
 
 
However, notwithstanding all the above, the fact that nearly ten years ago USAID 
(2000: 63) called the role of parties in legislatures not just an ‘emerging issue’ for 
legislative strengthening but one ‘where progress can be expected to proceed only 
slowly’, and that nine years on fresh calls for this to happen are on the increase, tel us 
the path will not be easy. Before the obstacles are identified, however, the next 
section first draws out arguments in favour of the recommendation. 
 
SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS 
The case for a closer relationship depends to some extent on the precise nature of the 
recommendation. Usually this is left unclear. Different terms like greater 
coordination, cooperation, and integration are used but not defined in any detail: the 
full implications for projects or programmes and no less important for organisational 
arrangements both between and inside the relevant institutional actors are not spelled 
out. There is a considerable difference between sharing experiences, which to some 
extent already happens, and the systematic integration of assistance intervention 
strategies in advance. Nevertheless, three supporting arguments that appear to 
underlie the recommendations can be teased out below. 
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First, while at one level legislative strengthening and party support are both 
committed to advancing the cause of democratic governance current evidence points 
to some shared limitations. This prompts an inference that joining forces in some way 
will make it easier for the weaknesses to be overcome (see Power 2008). 
 
Perhaps the most salient shared characteristic here is that parliamentary and party 
assistance are generally judged to be the most politically sensitive areas of 
international democracy assistance. This may explain why they have been less 
favoured than other forms such as capacity building in civil society, although that too 
can attract political complications. However the sensitivities are not all identical. 
External involvement with a country’s legislature – the supreme law-making body – 
touches directly on issues of national sovereignty; involvement with parties carries 
risks of being construed by the government in partisan terms, even when support is 
offered on a multiparty basis. Partisanship is inescapable where international donors 
shun parties whose democratic credentials are weak or have unacceptably racist, 
tribal, sexist or xenophobic agendas.  
 
That said, in some countries in Africa for instance even parliamentary strengthening is 
said to run ‘the risk of being identified with short-term partisan political agendas’ 
(AAPPG 2008: 45). Governments may interpret even these efforts as a direct 
challenge, in one party dominant states for instance. However, clearly this is different 
from suspicions arising from local concern about the underlying policy intentions of 
external actors, which in the case of foreign aid donors, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions particularly, may be bound up with their advice on the kind of neo-liberal 
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macro-economic measures and public expenditure control that donors believe vital to 
development. Here parliamentarians across all parties may have common anxieties 
about external imposition, if not objecting also to the actual policy substance; 
opposition party politicians, denied the increased patronage that aid brings to the 
government side, have grounds for being even more antipathetic than government 
supporters.  The growing interest that some aid donors now evince in strengthening 
legislatures for the purpose of advancing the national commitment to pro-poor 
development broadens the policy agenda, but far from bringing the age of foreign aid 
conditionality to an end it can be viewed as adding yet a further new twist. 
 
Second and moving beyond simple observations that legislative and party support 
invite strong politicisation, there is an underlying albeit barely articulated rationale for 
combining efforts stemming from the idea that the state of parliaments and the 
condition of the parties are mutually interdependent, almost everywhere. A weak 
legislature that has limited formal powers is bad for the political parties, whether the 
system is presidential, parliamentary or hybrid. In legislatures overawed by executive 
domination opposition parties may wither between elections, especially where floor-
crossing is allowed. The chances of establishing a competitive party system are 
reduced accordingly. The scenario can then become self-perpetuating: weak parties or 
a dominant party system undermine the capability of the legislature and its chance of 
enjoying real autonomy.  Putting increased resources at the disposal of parliament and 
training exercises may do little to change the situation. Lack of public trust in the 
parties and their viability will reflect badly on confidence in the legislature. 
Conversely, a legislature that looks badly organised or remote from the people 
damages public perceptions of political parties and politicians – actors who tend to be 
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among the least trusted of all public institutions, according to successive opinion 
surveys in many new democracies. 
 
The upshot then is that improvements to the legislature and to the parties can go hand 
in hand: there is a synergy. After all, the same type of actor - and the same individuals 
even (MPs) - define the membership of legislatures and sit at the top of the pyramid of 
political party organisation. This distinguishes the potential nexus between much 
legislative and party work from other combinations of support to democratic 
governance that involve very different partners and stakeholders, ranging from 
professional bureaucrats to civil society leaders. And yet not all the benefits to parties 
and legislatures from a more joined-up approach to support can be expected to occur 
simultaneously; some sequencing is inevitable, especially where reform programmes 
must be implemented gradually and the indirect effects take time to materialise. These 
considerations should inform how recommendations for a closer relationship are put 
into operation, to avoid disappointment later. And more thought could be given to 
why one of the world’s most powerful legislatures, the US Congress, can coexist with 
parties that look very weak by West European standards, in contrast to Britain, where 
historically parties have been strong but parliament has been criticised for being weak 
vis-à-vis the executive (Weir and Beetham 1999).  
 
Third, there is the recommendation found in some reports on legislative strengthening 
that more effort should be given to raising the demand for parliamentary reform from 
the countries themselves, contrary to a supply-drive approach (see for example 
Hudson and Wren 2007: 48). This two-pronged argument for establishing greater 
local ‘ownership’ says the impetus must originate from within the country, not 
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international ‘donors’, and that to be effective especially in countering resistance by 
governments and their supporters in parliament the reform agenda must come from 
society, pushed from the ‘bottom up’. Looking to parliament for a parliamentary 
development plan may prove fruitless, as Hudson and Tsekpo 2009 found in 
Cambodia and Tanzania. The political case for working across the parties both inside 
and outside parliament gains accordingly. It is parties in parliament who must agree to 
legislate reforms affecting parliament that will help it to become a stronger instrument 
of representation, pass good laws and hold the executive to account. Conversely the 
state of the parties and party system are a function in part of legal arrangements 
covering eligibility for registration as a party, party funding, codes of electoral 
conduct and media access: so, legislative initiatives matter to the political parties.22
 
  
GROUNDS FOR CAUTION 
 
The recommendations urging a closer relationship of legislative strengthening and 
party support naturally do not outline arguments against. But grounds for being 
cautious about the merits and sceptical that successful measures to implement the 
recommendations will emerge soon merit discussion. Five broad points will be made 
here. 
 
Limitations of the arguments 
First are the limitations of the very arguments that have been offered in support. Take 
the issue of political sensitivities. It is difficult to see how multilateral aid donors 
wanting to support legislative strengthening can benefit from courting the risk of 
being drawn closer to partisan conflicts between parties, let alone the factional and 
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personal rivalries often found inside parties, even if good relations with the 
government can be maintained. The danger of being associated with parties that 
subsequently move in an illiberal direction or abuse public office when given the 
chance would be ever present. Take also the potential for manufacturing win-win 
situations for parties and legislatures. Not all party work guarantees a favourable 
outcome for the legislature; strengthening a dominant party may actually worsen the 
situation. Conversely training that helps MPs understand better the more technocratic 
side of government can contribute to widening the gap between the party in 
parliament and/or in office and the party in the country, accentuating further an 
already weak social rootedness. And finally, take the question of ownership: in 
countries like China and Vietnam where meaningful political pluralism is disallowed 
or the ruling party very hierarchical, or international support to parties is severely 
constrained, opportunities for employing parties to cultivate a bottom-up approach to 
legislative strengthening are restricted.  
 
Partnership matters 
For changes to modes of international assistance to work effectively the agreement of 
all the main stakeholders is essential. And yet while the reports recommending a 
closer relationship of legislative and party support draw on fact-finding inside the 
countries, and occasionally reproduce local opinion saying the state of the parties 
influences parliamentary effectiveness parliament,23they offer scant evidence of local 
thinking about how to turn recommendations for integrated assistance into a reality. 
The approbation of governments who have power to block initiatives seems largely 
absent. This is critical. In party work there are several potential categories of partner - 
party leaders; party officials at headquarters; grass-roots structures; sometimes 
 16 
separate branches for women and youth. Similarly in legislative strengthening there 
are different potential partners, who include the parliamentary staff as well as 
government leaders in the assembly, and MPs of all affiliations. Universal agreement 
on what needs to be done, and reasons why, seems lacking. Moreover in so far as the 
various international actors introduced earlier have each developed their own 
preferred partnerships already – both in respect of countries or stakeholders inside 
those countries and cooperating partners drawn from the international actor ranks  – 
efforts to reshape assistance strategies now require further dialogue to identify exactly 
who has the will and capability to translate vague recommendations into meaningful 
practice.  Even on its own the landscape of parliamentary strengthening is said to be 
‘all too often characterised by duplication, gaps in provision and high transaction 
costs that are borne by poorly-resourced parliaments’ (Hudson and Tsekpo 2009: 6). 
 
Coordination problems 
Whereas some major legislative support actors have considerable experience of 
working together on a formal basis (for example around three quarters of WBI 
sponsored-initiatives are delivered in conjunction with partners), the party support 
actors generally tend to work more by themselves, or when cooperating often do so 
informally and on an ad hoc basis. Historically the major share of all democracy 
assistance and governance aid is conceived and structured along sectoral or intra-
sectoral lines, with little experience of genuinely cross-sectoral (as distinct from 
multi-sectoral) programmes. This applies both to organisations engaged in all main 
sectors of democracy aid and those with a more specialised if still plural focus, CDI 
for example. Strong moves to merge activities across sectors risk disrupting the 
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functional relationships that currently exist between projects or programmes within 
sectors, as well as having implications for relations among the various stakeholders.  
 
Adding further complication is a parallel recommendation in debates on legislative 
strengthening for closer cooperation among partners across the developing 
democracies themselves, within a region like southern Africa. And while 
representatives of national parliaments can readily exchange knowledge and share 
insights in an organisation like the Southern African Development Community 
Parliamentary Forum, helped if needed by financial or other assistance from an 
outside body like the Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA), 
linking this in to closer engagement with support for the region’s many political 
parties introduces extra political and bureaucratic challenges that could prove just 
overwhelming. 
 
That existing differences among the international actors in terms of size, 
organisational structure and political sensitivity will colour responses to 
recommendations for a closer parliamentary/party support relationship is not the only 
point: the consequences of (selective) involvement must be considered too. For 
instance one projection is that the providers of multi-party and cross-party support 
would be placed at an advantage relative to party support providers who, like 
Germany’s Stiftungen, have often preferred a more partisan approach. And if, as has 
been suggested in the context of Sweden and SIDA, official funding for legislative 
strengthening draws in party support and begins to impose its own monitoring and 
supervision requirements, then the political autonomy cherished by party aid 
providers will be put at risk (see Öhman, Öberg, Holmström, Wockelberg and Åberg 
 18 
2004). In contrast Fukuyama and McFaul’s (2007-08: 40) conclusion that 
governments such as the US should not by themselves provide technical assistance to 
political parties anywhere, carries its own bias affecting the combinations of 
legislative and party support organisations who can ‘do business’ together – also with 
consequences for the relative standing of the different actors inside each of the two 
sectors of democracy support.  
 
The different timescales for legislative strengthening and party support introduces a 
further complication. Legislatures are endowed with permanency by a country’s 
constitution; in new democracies many political parties inevitably have a short life. In 
theory advice on reforming the powers and procedures of a legislature can be put into 
effect quickly; building parties that can endure electoral defeats requires a much 
longer term commitment. While party support must also be nimble enough to 
recognise that parties in terms both of their electoral popularity and parliamentary 
representation can rise as well as fall very quickly, ‘many years of sustained 
engagement’ are usually required to build parliamentary effectiveness (Hudson and 
Tsekpo 2009: 7). These differences matter not least for the possibility of designing 
timely and appropriate evaluations of assistance interventions, bringing together 
legislative and party support. There is more pressure than ever before to subject 
democracy assistance to rigorous evaluation. For example in late 2008 UNDP and 
International IDEA commissioned research into the usefulness of IDEA’s ‘Research 
and Dialogue with Political Parties’, and USAID began commissioning a two-year 
evaluation of its own party assistance. So far evaluations of democracy support have 
encountered significant difficulties and disagreements (see Burnell 2007). By 
appearing to multiply programme objectives the meshing of legislative and party 
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support efforts could further compound the difficulties of reaching consensus on a 
credible approach to evaluation – and on the findings. 
 
Finally, a remark often heard from democracy assistance practitioners is that their 
approach must always retain the facility to be flexible and seize on opportunities, 
which can arise unexpectedly. Projects and programmes may have to be refashioned 
in mid-term in response to changing political circumstances. Also, in hostile 
environments like Belarus useful party work has to be covert or confidential. These 
properties are more difficult to accommodate within a coordinated regime that 
requires a strong measure of forward planning, detailed allocation of tasks and 
bureaucratic organisation. 
 
Tensions among objectives 
More coherent than across-the-board recommendations, then, a selective approach to 
combining legislative and party support activities must acknowledge that possibilities 
exist for tensions as well as synergies. Indeed, where an illiberal civilian 
government’s reluctance to embrace greater democracy or the democratic 
shortcomings of the party in power make all-party support unappealing to 
international actors, suggestions that party and legislative support should be combined 
are unlikely to gain much headway. If ownership by the government is made a 
requirement then the government has a veto power that could prove stifling. Support 
focussed just on opposition parties, if feasible, could be a more promising option, or, 
as in Zimbabwe where such support prompted government aggression against the 
opposition, assistance to the legislature independently is more attractive.. 
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Irrespective of which approach to party support best serves to promote the objective 
of competitive party politics, that systemic objective does not always sit easily with a 
central feature of effective parliamentary oversight of the executive that makes 
willingness to set aside party differences, and adopt a common purpose, essential. 
Also, in societies emerging from violent conflict actors like UNDP look to parliament 
as a place where inclusive dialogue and leadership in national reunification must set 
examples to the people, rather than encourage the spirit of adversarial or highly 
confrontational politics. Where MPs face an awkward balancing act between pursuing 
one kind of politics in the assembly with a different, more robust contestation in the 
country, weaving a single ‘holistic’ package of external support for both legislature 
and parties combining all objectives will be difficult. However this does not mean the 
different objectives cannot be served separately: the NIMD’s distinctive approach to 
engaging in cross-party work for example appears to have enjoyed some success.24
 
  
However, where relations between parties in parliament are as bad as they are claimed 
in Lebanon it seems that the UNDP’s parliamentary programme there should 
concentrate on working with parliamentary officers, while efforts to assist the parties 
must take place somewhere else, outside the country even (Murphy and Alhada 2007: 
40). 
Hard-to-reach independent variables 
Important factors that have influenced the effectiveness of legislative or party support 
and seem impervious to influence by either activity operating in isolation would 
continue to be hard to affect even by the two activities working in close combination. 
One such is the overall resource constraint. There are few grounds for thinking that 
additional funding will be made available and earmarked for combined initiatives. 
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The ability of legislatures and political parties or of international democracy 
assistance generally to further democratisation is constrained by a range of variables 
both at home and abroad, which direct support to these institutions either separately or 
together cannot remove. These variables include the electoral system design (where 
democracy support is sometimes presented as an aspect of party or parliamentary 
work but is not sufficient to guarantee strong parties and healthy competition), 
underlying social cleavages and the political culture. The removal of power over 
important policy decisions to institutions of governance outside the country, foreign 
aid donors in particular, is a further factor. Remedies for the negative effects lie 
outside most democracy assistance, which by accentuating the profile of outsiders can 
actually make the problem worse. At the same time international development aid and 
governance assistance strengthen the hand of the executive. Even so, we should not 
forget there are limitations on legislative effectiveness and multi-party development 
that domestic initiatives can tackle even without international support, an example 
being constitutional changes that prohibit the practice of floor-crossing, as 
exemplified in South Africa’s National Council of Provinces in late 2008. 
 
A MORE PROMISING APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING? 
 
The prospects of recommendations for aligning legislative strengthening and party 
support more closely should not be assessed in isolation from other recommendations 
currently voiced in the literature. One of the most notable is the promotion of public 
policy issues around which parliamentarians can be mobilised on a non-partisan basis, 
within the context of lending support to parliamentary processes. As an approach this 
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has the potential to gain more momentum, now that multilateral and bilateral 
development aid donors show increasing interest in legislatures - in part as one 
element of a strategy to bring about improvements in public financial management, 
tackling corruption in particular.  
 
Even some years ago UNDP (2003) remarked that an issue-based approach may be 
‘emerging as a significant means by which to expose democratic values while 
building the capacity of the parliament’; more recently others have identified specific 
issue areas where the idea could be put into practice, with macro-economic and 
budgetary policy, fiscal performance, and pro-poor development featuring strongly.25
 
 
In a concrete example from 2004 the UNDP in conjunction with NDI issued a three-
part ‘toolkit’ for strengthening parliamentary involvement in the poverty reduction 
strategy process, with reference to achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals 
in particular. The same year DFID’s Policy Division produced Helping Parliaments 
and Legislative Assemblies to Work for the Poor (2004). Illustrative of the line of 
thinking more generally is Miller’s (2005: 9) comment drawing on his experience at 
the PCC, ‘it may be far more valuable from a democracy promotion point of view to 
have a workshop that brings parliamentarians together with other governance players 
from civil society, business, government to discuss health care than a half day 
workshop on how to conduct a parliamentary committee meeting’. Several issue areas 
of particular importance to building democracy through legislative involvement in 
policy and oversight have been largely absent from this discourse however, the 
security sector for instance. 
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A major rationale offered for the issue approach is that it could circumvent some of 
the political sensitivities bedevilling party aid and direct approaches to strengthening 
legislatures as well, particularly on the government side. It is less threatening. 
Plausibly political parties too have much to gain from improving MPs’ grasp of policy 
but only if their increase in understanding can be institutionalised in the party 
structures somehow. A bonus for legislatures would be where greater attention to 
policy issues leads parliamentarians to give more weight to holding government 
accountable for policy implementation, subverting the ties of neo-patrimonial and 
clientelistic politics that bind them to the executive. There may also be an unspoken 
expectation that extra resources will be brought to legislative strengthening from the 
consierable funds that key development policy initiatives receive from international 
aid and the ‘good governance’ programmes attached to this end. 
 
However, the balance of advantages that an issue-based approach could mean for 
political parties and even for legislatures, and for democratisation, is definitely mixed. 
The resistance at a conceptual and bureaucratic level to the idea of reprogramming 
legislative strengthening activities to support economic development activities, that 
has been reported at USAID (2006) for example, hints at some possible objections. 
Three can be cited here. 
 
First, the idea is not suitable for every country. Just as some countries need 
development assistance but are not viewed as priorities for democracy assistance 
(because they already are democracies, or because the priorities of state-building or 
reconstruction must come first), or international democracy support is not welcome, 
so there are countries where weak legislature (and parties) could benefit from 
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international engagement but have no need of development aid - oil-exporting rentier 
states in the Gulf, for instance.26
 
  
Second, when combining sectoral assistance defined in terms of a particular aspect of 
the political process or political institutions  - as in legislative and party strengthening 
- with issue-based support related to development programmes there is the possibility 
that the latter will come to dominate the agenda (Hubli and Schmidt 2007: 25). 
Governments with weak democratic inclinations whose legitimacy and popularity rest 
heavily on policy performance can be expected to encourage just such a scenario. 
Finding ways to evaluate international interventions that aim at a mixture of 
substantive policy outputs and changes in political process or institutions poses a 
formidable challenge: the former, being easier to design, more readily quantifiable 
and, very possibly, more susceptible to demonstrating tangible results quickly may 
influence the decision-making disproportionately: these qualities count with decision-
makers responsible for allocating resources among competing claims. 
 
Third, an issue based approach to legislative strengthening tempts the international 
providers both of democracy aid and, more especially, governance assistance for 
development, to expand support to civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). This already forms a distinctive growing feature 
of donor involvement. Not only is civil society capacity-building a well established 
sectoral approach to supporting democratisation but steps to involve civil society in 
approaches to improving governance are becoming popular with aid donors too: it can 
be seen as the other side of the coin of low confidence in the politicians.27 
Organisations for development ranging from the World Bank to DFID increasingly 
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look to CSOs not just to lobby parliamentarians but to take up policy demands and 
grievances directly with government (‘societal accountability’) and, even, engage 
directly with such institutions of horizontal accountability as the courts, ombudsman, 
national audit office and anti-corruption commission (‘diagonal accountability’).28
 
 
DFID’s small Governance and Transparency fund, established in 2007, is a modest 
example.  Much encouragement is being aimed at making governments more 
accountable for the way they spend public money - and hence the way that foreign is 
used - and to ensure development strategies of the kind that international donors 
prefer have more solid backing from society. But are the consequences for legislative 
strengthening aimed at building democracy necessarily beneficial? 
Civil society, development and democratisation 
Until recently parliaments as well as parties were marginalised in the efforts made by 
aid donors to leverage improvements in financial management by governments and 
shape their policies towards development. Since the introduction of poverty reduction 
strategies from the late 1990s civil society leaders in aid-dependent countries 
routinely discuss with the Ministry of Finance and international donors this aspect of 
public policy. However, as often as not parliaments continued to be presented with a 
fait accompli. A review for the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2005) 
found that poverty strategies were formally presented to parliament in only a third of 
the countries.29
 
 
More recently this situation has begun to change, propelled by trends in development 
aid to advance general budgetary support in place of tied project aid and by doubts 
about the effectiveness of traditional aid conditionality. Both point to a case for 
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strengthening the domestic instruments of accountability. Much of the increased 
attention now being focused on legislatures should be seen against this background. 30
 
 
It has meant among other things considerable interest in helping public accounts 
committees and their relationship with a national audit office. An important example 
is the Parliamentary Strengthening Programme of the WBI, whose main objectives are 
to strengthen the capacity of parliaments to oversee the allocation and use of public 
funds, assist parliaments in better representing the interests of the poor in the policy 
process, and support parliamentary learning networks. Having helped to train around 
10,000 parliamentarians over the last 15 years, the WBI now seeks to enhance the 
capacity of parliament as an institution of governance. Moreover not just the WBI and 
bilateral donors like DFID but even democracy support actors are now being 
encouraged to become more involved in helping parliaments strengthen their capacity 
to exercise fiscal oversight especially. Recent examples include CDI and WFD’s work 
with parliament’s finance committee in Lebanon and Yemen’s parliament. The PCC 
chose parliament’s role in the budget process as the first model for developing 
specific performance indicators to implement its idea of a Parliamentary Report Card. 
These and other examples point to cooperation with the agenda of improving 
governance for development – a core concern of the donors.  
Of course not only has control of the power of the purse been central to struggles over 
democratisation down the ages but government  accountability more broadly is a 
fundamental attribute of democracy. Furthermore poverty reduction is consistent with 
a widely-held theoretical perspective that maintains there are social requisites of 
stable democracy. Nevertheless, for the majority of international organisations 
currently showing increased interest in legislative strengthening the financial, 
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economic and social goals are primary, not democracy per se. And it is as an 
instrument for leading governments to adopt and implement efficiently and effectively 
policy preferences that donors believe are necessary - and which civil society leaders 
may be brought to endorse - that parliament seems to be valued most.31
 
 Clearly this is 
not the same as giving priority to democratisation - where democratic notions that 
vest sovereignty in the people, value participation for various reasons and insist on 
inclusive representation figure in the reasoning just as strongly as accountability. 
What is more, mainstream political analysis agrees that in representative democracy 
strong political parties remain essential for these purposes, not least by offering 
vehicles for society to make choices over policy, even if parties the world over 
display shortcomings in practice. Parties can also play a crucial role in overcoming 
deep social divisions after violent conflict. The claim of legislatures to provide 
inclusive representation, their constitutionally mandated powers to control the 
executive especially in parliamentary systems, and the presence of the electoral 
sanction that holds  MPs themselves to account, all have no equivalent in the realm of 
civil society. There, leaders are often self-appointed, the collective coverage of 
society by CSOs is partial and uneven, and the actors most frequently consulted by 
the policy-makers may lack the popular support or membership base of the most 
successful parties. While CSOs too may be afflicted by weaknesses found in the 
parties, pervasive clientelism for instance, lacking the legal and political status of 
parliaments they may be more vulnerable to excessive regulation than the parties.  
 
That some modest attention is now focussing on grounds for strengthening the 
connections between civil society and parliaments and other state institutions may 
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prove good for development. But if the corollary means that political parties are left 
far behind then the overall benefit to democratisation begins to look less secure. 
Expressions of concern about where such developments might lead have circulated 
informally in discussions about party strengthening in democracy assistance for some 
time; a recent, perhaps even more worrying twist is suggested by the reported 
grievance of MPs in Malawi that external support to CSOs is ‘setting civil society and 
parliament against one another’ (AAPPG 2008: 35).32
 
 Possibly more alarming still is 
yet another observer’s claim that the success of civil society’s growing involvement in 
government activities such as budget decision-making, through initiatives like 
participative budgeting, may actually ‘depend on a weak legislature or undermine the 
power of the legislature’ - because governments require ‘space to innovate’ without 
waiting on the legislature’s consent (Krafchik 2005: 9). The final outcome, then, may 
include neither a vibrant party system nor a particularly strong legislature; and 
stronger, mutually supportive relations between the two could be even more remote. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
International interest in legislative strengthening is on the increase. There is a 
consensus that efforts could achieve better results. The learning curve up to now has 
included the idea that more effort should be put into working with parliamentarians 
and the political context and functioning of legislatures, emphasising less the 
infrastructural support and technical capabilities. Against this background the article 
has argued that recent recommendations for closer cooperation between legislative 
and party support, aimed at making the former more effective will probably make 
limited progress. A more detailed specification of what a closer relation means in 
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practice and the implications for relationships among the different international 
actors, as well as for relations with local partners, must be worked out first. Here, the 
views of local stakeholders will be important. Yet as some have argued, in regions 
like Africa an exercise even more fundamental must take place first, namely thorough 
empirical investigation into the legislatures and their relations with parties and 
government (AAPPG 2008: 55).33
 
 
The reasons why largely parallel but separate endeavours have prevailed in the past 
will continue to pose obstacles. Some could even be compounded by closer 
integration. For at least some legislative strengtheners, especially in the development 
community, wariness of the extra political risks that come with party involvement will 
be hard to dispel: a preference for alternative approaches, old or new, seems likely to 
persist. And for at least some party support organisations, democracy institutes and 
party aid foundations especially, the chances that their autonomy will be threatened 
by forming closer ties with development aid sponsors of legislative support might 
weigh against joining increased cooperation.  
 
In trying to get the balance right in democracy assistance attention should be paid not 
just to the distribution of total effort between the different sectors - state institutions 
such as parliaments, political parties, and civil society - but to the relationships among 
the sectors as well. More particularly, if international support for strengthening the 
links between civil society and the executive, parliament, courts and other state 
institutions gathers increasing momentum, then recommendations for party and 
legislative strengthening to combine forces may easily get left behind. If party 
development is disadvantaged by this then the long term consequences may not serve 
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legislative strengthening well, particularly in parliamentary systems. An issue-based 
approach to supporting legislative development by itself may do little to help party 
development. And in so far as it originates in the desire of development aid donors to 
promote their preferred choice of development strategies, democratic aims and 
objectives important to party support actors and legislative strengtheners in the 
democracy assistance world may come to be downgraded in relative terms too. 
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NOTES 
1. Conceptual, methodological and source limitations make precise overall data 
elusive. For illustrative purposes, UNDP (2006: 11) says it supports one in 
three parliaments in the developing world in some way; and political parties in 
over 60 countries have received support from the US’s National Democratic 
Institute for International Affairs (NDI) according to information available at 
http://www.ndi.org 
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2. Four substantial public meetings on parliaments and development organised 
by the UK’s Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Africa All Party 
Parliamentary Group (AAPPG) in London,  spring 2008 and a Wilton Park 
conference, ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of Parliaments: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, October 2008, underscore the point: summaries of the first are 
available at http://www.odi.org.uk.  
3. See Michael and Kasemets (2007) and the exchange with Rick Stapenhurst of 
the World Bank Institute in Journal of Legislative Studies (2008), 14 (3), pp. 
353-59. 
4. September 2008 saw the publication of Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: 
A World Perspective, edited by R. Stapenhurst, R. Pelizzo, D. Olson and L. 
von Trapp (Washington DC: World Bank). For other development 
organisations like Britain’s Department for International Development 
(DFID), Brösamle, Dimsdale, Mathiesen and Merz (2007: 19) say that the 
ultimate purpose of supporting parliaments, their budget oversight function in 
particular, ‘is fairly obvious’: ‘promote development and reduce poverty’ and 
create ‘the institutional conditions to make development aid effective’.  
5. The UNDP’s flagship Global Programme for Parliamentary Strengthening, 
with core funding of 6 million Euros for 2004-08, supports projects in 12 
countries including Algeria, Benin, Morocco and Niger plus regional and 
global initiatives. WFD’s core programme countries include Belarus, Ukraine, 
Serbia, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone, the last being a special site of 
cross-party collaboration. 
6. Around one sixth of the USAID bid is earmarked for ‘political competition 
and consensus-building’, less than for each of rule of law and human rights, 
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good governance, and civil society. Over 1990-2006 USAID spent around 
$240 million on legislative strengthening. Three quarters of SIDA’s 
parliamentary assistance is channelled through multilateral and international 
non-governmental organisations. 
7. The PCC receives funding from bodies like the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), the World Bank, DFID and Denmark’s 
DANIDA. It has a long-standing involvement in helping develop the 
committee system of Ghana’s parliament, among other programmes. It is 
currently field-testing a Parliamentary Report Card to assess parliamentary 
performance, starting with Cambodia.  
8. CDI, an Australian government initiative in 1998 is funded by the Australian 
Agency for International Development. 
9. See Inter-Parliamentary Union (2003): major findings included the 
observation that support did not correlate strongly with regime enthusiasm for 
democracy and good governance. 
10. Hudson and Wren (2007), who found that DFID’s 30 or so parliamentary 
strengthening projects since 1998 focused on parliament as an institution, the 
committee system for example, rather than training MPs or on the wider 
political system. DFID cosponsored a noteworthy international conference on 
‘Enhancing the effectiveness of parliaments: challenges and opportunities’, at 
Wilton Park in October 2008. 
11. Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, close to the Social Democratic Party and 
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, related to the Christian Democratic Union, are 
the mot active Stiftungen in democracy support; Sweden’s Olof Palme Center, 
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linked to the country’s Social Democratic Party, similarly has partnerships 
with like-minded parties abroad.   
12. On party strengthening see especially Carothers (2006) and Burnell (2004). 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), an 
inter-governmental policy research organisation based in Stockholm, offers 
commentary on party support, as in Catón (2007) for instance. The recent 
flurry of informative reports on legislative strengthening includes Hudson and 
Wren (2007), Hubli and Schmidt (2007), Murphy and Alhada (2007), Africa 
All Party Parliamentary Group (2008) and Huson and Tsekpo (2009). 
Significant studies from the WBI include N. Johnston and L. von Trapp 
(2008), following previous reports by Pelizzo, Stapenhurst and Olson. 
13. The NDI now divides its party development support into four: operational and 
structural development; parties in elections; parties in parliament; legal and 
constitutional frameworks. Each is subdivided into further elements. NDI lists 
12 criteria for selecting partners, and offers 14 different training techniques.  
14. Wehner with Brösamle, Dimsdale, Mathiesen and Merz (2007: 38-9) 
distinguish between technical assistance in legal reform, developing structure 
and processes, improving information access, physical infrastructure 
development, budget training, study trips, and analytic work, before going on 
to identify the portfolios of globally active core actors categorised as either 
funders or implementers. 
15. Hubli and Schmidt (2007: 17) too note that ‘institutional repair’ packages are 
no longer considered sufficient.  
16. Hubli and Schmidt (2007) is a prime example; see also Michael and Kasemets 
(2007) and Hudson and Tsekpo (2009: 7). 
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17. For example a survey in Malawi found that along with representation easily 
the most frequently cited expectation of an MP by Malawians is to deliver 
development: ‘An MP’s contribution to the collective functions of parliament 
such as legislation and holding the executive to account was not seen as 
important’ (AAPPG 2008: 23). See also Barkan (2007). 
18. Apart from Power (2008: 23) other evidence includes study of programmes, 
direct communication from CDI and observations of NDI in the Balkans 
shared by Maja Nenadović, complementing Miller’s (2005: 10-11) 
characterisation of ‘organizational silos’ and ‘tunnel behaviour’ among 
Canadian organisations supporting democratic development. CDI’s support for 
strengthening party discipline in Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) parliament even 
had the aim of ending chronic government instability, which looks contrary to 
the objective of legislative strengthening. However, floor-crossing in 
parliament and mid-term upheavals had formerly undermined governmental 
accountability all round (Okole 2008). 
19. Catón (2007) for instance does not mention cooperation with legislative 
strengthening. 
20. UNDP (2005) subsequently listed 14 country offices engaged in capacity 
development for MPs, 13 each for parties and enhancing party dialogue, 11 for 
increasing women’s participation, 7 for strengthening party systems and 10 for 
improving electoral systems, in 43 countries.  
21. A further example is Rasheed Draman speaking in the fourth ODI/AAPPG 
meeting mentioned in note 2.  Together with the Overseas Office of the House 
of Commons, National Audit Office, UK branch of the CPA and other 
organisations, WFD in 2007 set up a Westminster Consortium for Parliaments; 
 40 
                                                                                                                                            
around the same time Hilary Benn (as Britain’s Secretary of State for 
International Development) publicly called on DFID, WFD, FCO, IPU and 
European Parliament to work together in parliamentary strengthening, in 
‘Governance, Democracy and Parliaments’, available at 
http:///www.dfid.gov.uk 
22 . Reilly and Nordlund (2008) examine the effects of party regulation and 
electoral system engineering on parties. 
23. For example, AAPPG (2008: 27-8), citing evidence from Malawi and Kenya.  
24. The European Centre for Development Policy Management (2005) evaluation 
of NIMD was largely positive. 
25. See for example USAID (2006), Wehner et al. (2007), Hubli and Schmidt 
(2007), Johnston and von Trapp (2008). 
26. Of course there could be other issues like the environment or gender equity 
where policy support from outside is appropriate and might be welcome. 
27.  AAPPG (2008: 18) says that in donor eyes ‘parliament is often seen more as a 
part of the problem than part of the solution’. 
28. In Africa for instance while support for social accountability is said to be in its 
infancy the demand is judged to be high (McNeil and Mumvuma 2006). 
29. ‘Development partners need to be aware of (and not bypass) participatory and 
representative processes and institutions that already exist’ (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund 2005: 10). 
30. On parliaments’ role in ensuring more effective and accountable aid see for 
example AAPPG (2008:19-20). Wehner et al. (2007) identify 15 international 
organisations now offering significant support to improving legislative 
financial scrutiny specifically. 
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31. That the policy frameworks often still originate with donors is attested to by 
commentators as diverse as the World Development Movement’s Jones and 
Hardstaff (2005), Hubli and Schmidt (2007:  23), and Zimmermann (2007), 
the last arguing for increased parliamentary involvement in development 
planning, policy and budgeting. AAPPG (2008: 7) adds that direct budget 
support particularly in Africa risks making the governments ‘more 
accountable to donors and less accountable to their people’. 
32. Between 2001 and 2004 DFID spent £4.4 million on promoting closer 
working between parliament and civil society and strengthening parliamentary 
committees in Malawi.   
33. Also, Hudson and Tsekpo (2009: 1): ‘there is little systematic research or 
analysis about the effectiveness of parliaments or about the effectiveness of 
parliamentary strengthening’ more generally. But on Africa see Barkan (2007) 
for a useful contribution. 
